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PRESERVATIONISM IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF MEMORY
By Matthew Frise
Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely:
if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S’s
belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in
the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert
Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for
it, in part by drawing on research in cognitive psychology. The dilemmas centre on preservationism’s
implications for certain cases involving either stored beliefs, forgotten evidence, or recollection failure.
Each dilemma shows that preservationism either is false or lacks key support.
Keywords: preservationism, memory, epistemic justification, problem of stored
beliefs, problem of forgotten evidence, problem of forgotten defeat.
I. INTRODUCTION
I believe I have a hand. My current experience supports my belief: it appears
to me that a hand is attached to what appears to be my arm, and I seem to feel
myself wiggling fingers. But most of my current beliefs are merely ‘stored’ in
memory. I’m not actively endorsing their contents. Andmy current experience
supports few of them.What epistemically justifies the merely stored beliefs that
seem justified? If there is no explanation, then most beliefs are unjustified. The
problem of stored beliefs is roughly the problem of supplying this explanation.1
This problem is sometimes conflated with a second: the problem of forgotten
evidence. This is roughly the problem of explaining how a belief can remain
1 Cf. Pappas (1980: 130). Frise (forthcoming b), Goldman (1999), and Senor (1993) direct this
problem at internalism about epistemic justification. Internalism states, among other things,
approximately that one’s mental life alone affects one’s justification (cf. Conee and Feldman
2004; the denial of this view is externalism).
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justified even when all past, direct evidence for it has been lost.2 I can’t recall
how I learned that there are such things as fainting goats, but I believe that
they exist, and justifiedly. But how is my belief justified? These problems differ
because we keep our evidence for some stored beliefs, and we sometimes forget
evidence for beliefs while they are right before our minds, outside of storage.
A received view in the literature on memory justification offers a solution to
both problems:
Preservationism. If S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains (in memory) a belief
that p until t2, then S’s belief that p is prima facie justified (via memory) at t2,3
where t2 is any time after t1. According to preservationism, when S keeps
a belief that p that had been formed with justification, the belief is prima
facie justified, even if the belief is stored, even if S is unable to recall why she
originally formed it, and even if none of S’s conscious mental states justify it.
In the absence of a reason not to believe p (a defeater), S’s belief is justified overall.
Memory preserves belief and justification. Or, since some preservationists drop
the parenthetical ‘in memory’ and ‘via memory’ from their theory: whatever
preserves belief preserves justification.
Preservationism theorizes about the justification of a subject’s belief (doxastic
justification) at a later time. As a result, it theorizes about the justification a
subject has for believing (propositional justification) at the later time. Any
subject with a justified belief that p later on has justification for, or is justified
in, believing that p later on.
It is important to distinguish preservationism from two theories sometimes
also called ‘preservationism’:
Anti-generativism. If S is prima facie justified in believing p viamemory at t, thenSultimately
acquired all S’s memory justification for believing p prior to t via some source(s) other
than memory.4
Preservationism∗. (1) Preservationism is true, and (2) If S’s belief that p is unjustified at t1
and S retains a belief that p until t2, then ceteris paribus S’s belief that p is unjustified at t2.
2 Many philosophers credit Harman (1986: ch.4) for introducing this problem, but see Pappas
(1980: 127–9). We often lose direct evidence for our beliefs, forgetting what our exact information
source was, what exactly it indicated, and in what exact context we encountered it. But we have
some indirect evidence for anything we believe, since we have reason to believe that we are rational
agents and therefore that most of our beliefs are justified. It would be a mistake to stipulate that
a rational agent has no evidence for something he believes. But for simplicity my discussion of
forgotten evidence hereafter omits the ‘direct’.
3 Preservationists include Annis (1980: 331), Bernecker (2008: 126), Burge (1997: 37), Goldman
(2009: 323–8, 2011: 261), Harman (1986: ch.4), Huemer (1999: 351), McGrath (2007: 14), Naylor
(2012: 614), Owens (1999: 318–20), Pappas (1980: 129–30), and Senor (2010: 523). Locke (1971:
96), Malcolm (1963: 230), Martin (2001: 264), and Shoemaker (1967: 271) endorse a structurally
parallel thesis about knowledge. Comesan˜a (2011: 490) calls preservationism conservationism, and
Bernecker (2008: 116) calls it the principle of continuous justification.
4 Anti-generativists includeGoldman (2009: 323, 2011: 259–60), Jackson (2011: 569–70), Naylor
(2015), and Senor (2007).
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Anti-generativism states that memory does not generate justification. At most,
memory preserves justification acquired from other sources, and it may not
even do that. Preservationism∗ states that memory preserves the positive or
negative justificatory status of a preserved belief.
The reason it is important to distinguish these theses from preservationism
is this. Anti-generativism has been attacked, but usually while being called
‘preservationism’.5 Similarly, Huemer (1999: 349–50) refers to the conjunction
of preservationism and anti-generativism as ‘the preservation theory’, and at-
tacks the conjunction simply by attacking anti-generativism. Huemer’s (1999:
351) preferred, alternative theory in fact entails preservationism. AndMcGrath
(2007: 4) calls preservationism∗ ‘preservationism’, and attacks preservationism∗
simply by attacking (2). But McGrath (2007: 14) endorses epistemic conser-
vatism which, I will show, entails preservationism. My point is this: several
theses called ‘preservationism’ or ‘the preservation theory’ have been attacked,
but preservationism has not. It has been an unchallenged orthodoxy in the
epistemology of memory for over forty years.6
In this paper, I challenge preservationism. But first I will mention additional
reasons for endorsing it. Preservationism is attractive not just because it offers
solutions to the problems of stored beliefs and forgotten evidence, but also
because it avoids the problem of forgotten defeat. Roughly, this is the problem that a
theory allegedly faces when it counts a subject’s unjustified belief from the past
as justified later on, simply because the subject forgets all past reasons not to
hold the belief. Preservationism evades this problem since any belief which it
implies is justified later on was, in the past, justified overall. Since the belief was
justified overall, the subject did not have reason to abandon it. Forgetfulness
does not result in an unjustified belief becoming justified, since there is no
defeater to forget. The problem of forgotten defeat does not emerge. It is
controversial whether the problem of forgotten defeat is a genuine problem,
but nearly all defenders of preservationism think it is.7 So, many philosophers
5 See e.g. Audi (2002: 75), Lackey (2007), Michaelian (2011), and Owens (1996: 320–1).
6 Michaelian (2011) doubts a standard preservationist assumption, namely, that memory typi-
cally stores rather than creates beliefs. In the interests of charity, I grant the assumption. Without
it, preservationism loses considerable support—it attributes little justification (its antecedent is
rarely satisfied), and thus trivially does not solve the problems of stored beliefs and forgotten
evidence. Senor (1995: 290) almost objects to preservationism. He thinks there are problems for
an improved version of epistemic conservatism, and the improved version just is preservationism.
The problems are that (a) preservationism has implications that are ‘completely foreign to the
spirit of evidentialism’, and that (b) a reliabilist will deny preservationism if memory is unreliable.
While (a) and (b) are correct, they are not objections. Memory is reliable, so reliabilists accept
preservationism as contingently true. And (a) gives no reason to prefer evidentialism to preser-
vationism. Indeed, evidentialists such as Conee & Feldman (2011: 304–5) offer a rival theory to
preservationism, but give no reason either. They don’t object to preservationism, but rather to
the claim that evidentialism lacks important resources that preservationism offers. In Sections II
and IV, I show that Conee and Feldman’s theory actually undermines preservationism.
7 See e.g., Annis (1980: 325–6), Goldman (2009: 324), andHuemer (1999: 348–9). For discussion
see Frise (2015).
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endorse preservationism because it solves two important problems without
introducing a third.
And some philosophers endorse it because it follows from a plausible, more
general theory of justification. For instance, epistemic conservatives likeGilbert
Harman (1986: ch. 4) and McGrath (2007) hold that if S believes that p, then
S is prima facie justified in retaining her belief that p. S’s believing that p a
moment ago is enough for her belief that p to be prima facie justified now.
It follows that S’s justifiedly believing that p a moment ago is enough for her
belief that p to be prima facie justified now—and this is just preservationism.
And, for instance, many process reliabilists hold that memory is a condition-
ally reliable belief-sustaining process—typically, when a true belief enters into
memory processing, only a true belief will come out. Reliabilists also hold that
if an initially justified belief is sustained by a conditionally reliable process, the
belief retains its justification.8 The conjunction of these two reliabilist theses
entails preservationism. But even Alvin Goldman, the father of reliabilism,
finds preservationism more obvious than reliabilism. Goldman (2009: 322–8)
uses preservationism to argue for reliabilism. He thinks preservationism handles
cases of stored belief, forgotten evidence, and forgotten defeat marvelously.
For Goldman (2011: 261), a good theory of justification accommodates preser-
vationism. Interestingly, preservationism is common ground between theories
as dissimilar as reliabilism and epistemic conservatism, paradigm externalist
and internalist theories of justification.
I will present three dilemmas, each showing that preservationism either is
false or lacks key support. By casting doubt on this orthodoxy, I also cast doubt
both on epistemic conservatism and on the conjunction of reliabilist theses that
entails preservationism. We should prefer a preservative-free epistemology.
II. A NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM
We will see my first dilemma by comparing two cases:
CASE1. Smith formed a justified belief that p a few weeks ago. By noon today his belief
is stored in memory and remains undefeated, even though Smith has forgotten all past
evidence for or against p, and has no new direct evidence for p.
CASE2. Smith∗ is Smith’s mental twin at noon today. But Smith∗ popped into existence
just at noon. At noon he and Smith share all experiences, beliefs, and dispositions to
believe, but all his apparent memories are misleading.9
8 Cf. Goldman (1979: 13) and Senor (2010: 523). Reliabilists may of course deny that preser-
vationism is true in any possible world in which memory is not conditionally reliable. But I am
evaluating whether preservationism is true even in worlds relevantly like ours.
9 Cf. Russell (1921). Huemer (1999: 349–50) uses an example like CASE2 to attack anti-
generativism, but not preservationism. My case crucially differs from Russell’s and Huemer’s
since it centers on a subject at the moment of his creation, not five minutes after.
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According to preservationism Smith’s belief that p is justified at noon today.
Preservationism has no implications about whether Smith∗’s belief that p is
justified at noon today. But is it? Preservationists face a dilemma. Either (a) no,
Smith∗’s belief that p is not justified, or (b) yes, it is. Because Smith and Smith∗
are mental twins at noon, it seems they should be fully alike in justification; it
should be that both justifiedly believe that p or that neither does. But on (a),
only one believes that p justifiedly. So at first glance, on (a), preservationists
face the new evil demon problem—they allow somementally identical subjects
to differ in justification—and there is reason to deny any theory facing this
problem.10
And at first glance, on (b), preservationism loses key support. Its main
appeal is its ability to solve economically the problems of stored beliefs and
forgotten evidence. On (b) Smith∗’s belief that p is justified at noon today, but
preservationism itself cannot explain how this is so. So preservationism is at best
a partial solution to these problems.What’s more, it’s initially hard to see a way
of supplementing preservationism that is not ad hoc. If there is an economical,
complete solution to these problems that doesn’t entail preservationism, then
there is much less reason to endorse preservationism. I will consider such
a solution shortly. First, let’s see if preservationism’s trouble on option (a) is
genuine.
Perhaps it seems this particular new evil demon problemwon’t worry preser-
vationists. After all, many preservationists are reliabilists, and reliabilists and
other externalists seem simply unmoved by the new evil demon problem.How-
ever, many reliabilists and other externalists are moved by the new evil demon
problem, tailoring their theories so that they specifically avoid it.11 And we
can stipulate that Smith∗’s beliefs are formed by reliable processes that in his
case happened to yield mostly false beliefs. Whatever processes form Smith∗’s
beliefs (say, the machinations of a benevolent demon) mostly form true beliefs
about the past.We can even stipulate that Smith∗ and Smith share a world, and
that similar processes form or sustain their beliefs. Reliabilists will agree that
(a) incorrectly denies that Smith∗ has justification, and that preservationism
should not be paired with it. For many philosophers, including reliabilists, it is
a desideratum of a theory that it never lets mere mass deception preclude jus-
tification. The deception must involve an epistemic defect. Smith and Smith∗
have different mental histories, but Smith∗’s history involves no epistemic de-
fect. It is not as if Smith∗ had an unjustified belief that p in the past. He has no
past. No past unjustifiedness could explain his lack of present justification. He
is simply deceived. The new evil demon problem here is indeed worrisome.
10 See Cohen (1984).
11 See e.g., Comesan˜a (2010), Goldman (1988), and Henderson and Horgan (2011: chs. 3–5).
Cf. Moon (2012).
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One might disagree, because CASE2 may seem incoherent. Following
Huemer (1999: 356n.15), we might hold that, in order for a subject to have a
stored belief, that belief must at some time have been occurrent. Therefore,
when a victim such as Smith∗ pops into existence, he lacks stored beliefs al-
together. Until Smith∗ occurrently believes that p, he has no belief that p that
could be justified or unjustified.
But there is reason to deny that a stored belief must at some time have been
occurrent. Information that enters memory is normally altered in at least three
stages of memory processing.12 If memory stores nearly as many beliefs as we
think it does, we should allow that we believe the content resulting from this
processing. But much of this content has never been occurrently endorsed. So
a stored belief need not have been occurrent at any time.
Perhaps (b) is the more promising option, then: Smith∗ justifiedly believes
that p. Above I argued that on (b) preservationism loses key motivation, be-
cause it is at best an incomplete solution to the problems of stored beliefs
and forgotten evidence. Preservationism itself does not imply (b), so we must
supplement it with some other theory in order to have a complete solution.
Perhaps we have found a non-ad hoc supplement: one of the reliabilist theories
that is tailored to avoid the new evil demon problem.
Let’s grant that there is a reliabilist supplement for preservationism that
explains (b). It is worth noting that, first, non-reliabilist theories like epistemic
conservatism cannot accept the supplement. So non-reliabilists still have not
explained (b). Secondly, preservationists will be saddled with all objections
its supplement already faces, so they may not ultimately be better off. And
thirdly, to supplement preservationism is to admit that, contrary to what is
commonly supposed, preservationism is an incomplete solution to the problems of
stored beliefs and forgotten evidence.
Now, this last point does not yet give reason to doubt preservationism. It gives
reason only if there is a more parsimonious solution to these problems, i.e. a
solution that needn’t appeal to a complete theory of justification.Unfortunately
for preservationism, there is such a solution. Conee and Feldman (2011: 304–5)
defend a view that rivals preservationism. On that view, having a disposition to
recall p as known can prima facie justify a stored belief that p. They claim that a
subject has such a disposition toward any proposition she has learned and not
forgotten (where ‘having learned’ is broadly understood). These dispositions
fully account for any justification in the thorny cases of stored beliefs and
forgotten evidence. Conee and Feldman’s view can count Smith and Smith13
each as having a justified belief that p at noon today. And Conee and Feldman’s
12 See Bernecker (2008: ch. 9), Frise (forthcoming a), and Michaelian (2011).
13 Dokic (2014) and Michaelian (2011) help motivate an additional rival solution that does not
appeal to a complete theory of justification (for elaboration see Frise forthcoming a). Michaelian
argues that memory can create justification for believing content that never entered memory and
content that entered but was not believed. Dokic argues that memory often generates support for
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view does not entail preservationism. On their view, if one keeps a belief that
was justified in the past, but one is not disposed to recall its content as known,
then contrary to preservationism the belief is not thereby prima facie justified.
So Conee and Feldman offer a rival solution to the problems of stored beliefs
and forgotten evidence without appealing to a complete theory of justification
(see footnote 13).
I am not arguing for their view. I am arguing that it is considerably simpler
than a supplemented version of preservationism that explains (b), and so their
view appears preferable. Perhaps it faces some problems that preservationism
can avoid. But until that is shown, on option (b) preservationism is inferior to
a rival.
Let’s take stock. Preservationists face a troubling new evil demon problem
on (a), a problem even many reliabilists want to avoid. Preservationism does
not explain (b), and so it is an incomplete solution to the problems motivating
it. A complete solution to these problems that includes preservationism is
insufficiently parsimonious. (a) gives us reason to doubt preservationism, and
(b) robs preservationism of key motivation. Philosophers who had some reason
to endorse preservationism will have less. Philosophers who had no reason
to endorse now have reason to doubt. Preservationists might not think this
dilemma topples their theory. Unhappily for them, however, my next two
arguments knock harder.
III. UNDERCUTTING DEFEAT OF FORGOTTEN EVIDENCE
I will introduce my second dilemma for preservationism with:
CASE3. Years ago Brown read the textbookUnited States History, which gave her evidence
for p, and as a result Brown formed a justified belief that p. She has retained her belief
ever since. By a moment before noon today, Brown has acquired no additional direct
evidence for p and has forgotten her original evidence for p and its source. However, at
noon she discovers that United States History mostly contains falsehoods. Her belief that p
remains stored.14
According to preservationism Brown’s belief that p is prima facie justified a
moment before noon today.
Does Brown’s noontime discovery that United States History mostly contains
falsehoods defeat her preservative justification for her belief that p, i.e., the jus-
tification she has for believing p in virtue of her satisfying preservationism’s
a judgement about the origin of a memory. These theses are consistent with preservationism, but
motivate a rival view on which memory primarily generates rather than preserves justification.
This rival is not threatened by the three dilemmas I present for preservationism.
14 Throughout I use ‘discovers’, etc., non-factively. The reader is free to understand such
terms factively if it helps persuade her of my points.
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antecedent? Either (a) yes, Brown’s discovery defeats her preservative justifica-
tion, or (b) no, it does not. If Brown had not forgotten why she had originally
formed a belief that p, her discovery would defeat her justification; her dis-
covery gives her reason to doubt that United States History is a good source of
information, thereby undercutting any support which she realizes she acquired
by reading the book. A subject’s evidence for p suffers undercutting defeat when
she has reason to suppose the evidence does not in her case support p. (Con-
trast this with the rebutting defeat of one’s evidence for p, which occurs when
one has counterbalancing reason to suppose not-p.) Preservationism in effect
allows forgotten past justifiers, whatever they may be, to continue to justify. But
it is not obvious whether the undercutting defeat of forgotten evidence defeats
descendent preservative justification.
I argue that either way of developing preservationism—adopting option
(a) or (b)—introduces significant problems for the theory. And preservationism
must be developed. It is a theory about only prima facie justification, not overall
justification. Yet much of its alleged support comes from its ability to solve the
problems of stored beliefs and forgotten evidence, and these problems centre
on overall justification. Solving these problems requires accounting for overall
justification. So, preservationists must say something about when preservative
justification is and is not defeated.
Some philosophers with preservationist-friendly views think that, when for-
gotten evidence suffers undercutting defeat, prima facie justification tracing
back to it is defeated too.15 They would defend (a); Brown is not at noon overall
justified in believing p. But now consider:
CASE4. Brown∗ is Brown’s mental twin at noon today. Brown and Brown∗ have identical
mental histories and have always had identical environments, except in this respect:
Brown∗’s original justified belief that p was instead a result of her acquiring evidence
for p by reading American History years ago. Brown∗ has acquired no additional direct
evidence for p, and has forgotten her original evidence for p and its source. At noon she
discovers that United States History mostly contains falsehoods. Her belief that p remains
stored.
Brown∗’s discovery does not defeat her preservative justification since it traces
back to evidence acquired from a different book. Preservationism implies that
at noon today Brown∗ is still justified in believing that p. And yet on (a),
preservationism implies that Brown is at noon not justified in believing that
p. But Brown and Brown∗ have all the same evidence, form beliefs in equally
reliable ways, are just as competent, share all beliefs, have nearly identical
pasts, and so on. Neither has ever been massively deceived. As far as Brown
can tell, discovering thatUnited States Historymostly contains falsehoods is of no
significance to p or to anything else she believes. The same is true of Brown∗.
15 See e.g., Naylor (2015: 380–2) and Senor (1995: 278–9).
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But according to preservationism this discovery eliminates Brown’s justification
and not Brown∗’s. This is implausible.
The problem here differs from the new evil demon problem discussed in
Section II. That problem was that preservationism makes it too hard for
certain twins to acquire justification. The problem here is that preservationism
on (a) makes it too hard for certain twins to retain justification. Brown loses
her justification for believing p because she unwittingly acquires a defeater
for evidence she no longer possesses, yet Brown∗ remains justified despite
acquiring the same information. At noon Brown could even recognize that
believing p solely on the basis of reading United States History is unjustified. She
could appreciate how defeat generally works and what counts as evidence for a
proposition, and she could be disposed to adjust her doxastic attitudes as soon
as she sees reason to. But from her perspective she lacks reason to. It seems
she should count as overall justified in believing that p.
And if she lacks this justification, which doxastic attitude toward p is justified
for her? It does not seem that Brown, as a result of discovering thatUnited States
History mostly contains falsehoods, should suspend judgment in p, or disbelieve that
p. After all, as far as Brown can tell her discovery is unrelated to p. It does not
seem reasonable for her, in response, to change her doxastic attitude toward p.16
Part of the trouble for preservationism is that studies strongly suggest that
we have fairly little memory for the sources of our beliefs, and what memory
we do have is highly fallible.17 We cannot recall the exact original sources of
evidence (particular people, books, websites, newspapers, etc.) for most of our
beliefs. Consider what happens if we generalize preservationism’s implications
on (a). Any time that we discover a source is unreliable, we lose justification
for any belief for which that source provided all our previous evidence. Since
we frequently cannot identify our sources, discovering that a source is unre-
liable will often, without our noticing, destroy all our justification for many
beliefs. Since we have no reason to think that our justification is lost, we will
typically keep these beliefs, unjustifiedly. On (a), even a subject in excellent
circumstances can lose her preservative justification too opaquely from her
perspective. Paired with (a), preservationism seems false.
Some preservationists think that preservative justification remains when
the relevant forgotten evidence suffers undercutting defeat; on (b), Brown’s
discovery does not defeat her preservative justification for believing that p.18
Epistemic conservatives and other internalists will prefer (b) to (a). So will many
externalists. Formany externalists, a subject’s justification is not defeated unless
the subject has some mental state (e.g., an experience or belief) that works
16 Feldman (2005: 282–3) and McGrath (2007: 4) make a similar point in different contexts.
17 Cf. Belli et al. (1994), Lindsay (1990), Schacter (2002: chs. 4–5), and Zaragoza and Lane
(1994). Our memory for sources in childhood is especially bad.
18 See e.g., Harman (1986: 38–42) and McGrath (2007: 7n.13).
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against her justification. What gets defeated (the ‘defeatee’) is also always
mental, namely, evidence or reasons.19 When evidence is lost or forgotten,
there is no defeatee. For many externalists, Brown’s preservative justification for
believing p remains since she no longer has the evidence for p that her discovery
threatens.
While (b) seems plausible, it fits poorly with preservationism. Suppose S
forms a justified belief that p, and its justification would be undercut in cir-
cumstanceC, butChas not obtained. Ifmemorymaintains the belief ’s justified
status, why doesn’t memory maintain its susceptibility to C? Presumably, on
the best explanation of why beliefs inherit past justification, beliefs also in-
herit defeat conditions. So it is hard to see why, on preservationism, Brown’s
discovery does not undercut her preservative justification.
But I will focus on a different worry: on (b), it is too hard for preservative
justification to suffer undercutting defeat. First, I will explain why it is hard.
Then, why it is too hard.
On (b), Brown’s discovery does not eliminate her preservative justification.
So what could eliminate it? A plausible answer is that whatever defeats preser-
vative justification indicates to a subject that she does not satisfy a somewhat
obviously necessary condition for having overall memorial support. Preserva-
tionism states no such necessary condition. What then is necessary? We’ll start
with one modest proposal:
OMJ1. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then S’s total past and
present memorial support for p has been adequate.
I will leave ‘memorial support’ imprecise so as not to presuppose any particular
theory about what provides it. And I focus here on propositional rather than
doxastic justification for the following reason. Preservationism states only how
memory justifies an attitude one has. But memory can also justify having an
attitude one happens to lack. What eliminates even this justification? The
answer to this question is part of the complete answer to what could eliminate
Brown’s preservative justification, that is, to what could indicate to Brown that
she does not satisfy a fairly obvious necessary condition for having overall
memorial support. Whatever undercuts all propositional memory justification
undercuts preservative justification.
OMJ1 is perhaps boringly trivial. But it helps us identify another necessary
condition. It seems that, if being in some condition C is required for overall
justification, then having reasonable doubts that you are in C undercuts your
justification. OMJ1 identifies one such C, and so it recommends:
OMJ2. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then it is not the case that
S is overall justified in believing that S’s total past and present memorial support for p
has been inadequate.
19 See e.g., Bergman (2006: 155 & 160). Cf. Goldman (2011: 272, esp. n.15).
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Overall memorial justification requires an absence of relatively strong rational
doubt about one’s memorial support. This may also be boringly trivial. Given
OMJ2, I see one type of undercutting defeater for memorial justification
in general and for preservative justification in particular. Defeaters of this
type can be misleading, and can themselves be defeated. Here is an account
of it:
HOD. D is a higher-order defeater for any memorial justification S has for believing p iff
D indicates to S that S has had a body of evidence E such that (a) E includes S’s total
past evidence for p and present memorial evidence for p, and such that (b) E does not
sufficiently support p.
If D is a higher-order defeater for S’s memorial justification, then D indicates
the following to S: E does not support p for S (although E might normally
support p), and E contains S’s present memorial evidence (e.g., an occurrent
recollection) and past evidence (testimonial, perceptual, etc.) for p. D might
indicate that E is in S’s case misleading, or that in S’s case a crucial element
of E originated from an unreliable source, or that S’s belief that p is essentially
sustained by an unreliable process.20 D can, but needn’t, specify what S’s
original evidence for p was. D can simply indicate that, whatever it was, it does
not support p. And D can misleadingly indicate what S’s past evidence for p
was. S’s having both D and insufficient reason to doubt D prevents S from
satisfying OMJ2, eliminating any support for p that S’s past evidence normally
gives.
Now, it may seem that a higher-order defeater is fairly easy to acquire.
Brown, in relatively normal circumstances, could learn that her former history
instructor was a prankster, a revisionist, or a disgruntled employee, and so he
selected a textbook for Brown’s history course thatmostly contained falsehoods.
Brown has forgotten what this textbook was, but it can still be discredited for
her with ease.
Even so, Brown would not yet have a higher-order defeater. CASE3 stipu-
lates that Brown has forgotten all evidence for p. An accessible memory of her
learning p from a history textbook is evidence for p, so by stipulation she lacks
such a memory. Merely discovering that her instructor assigned a misleading
text therefore wouldn’t jeopardize her preservative justification for p—Brown
has forgotten that that text contributed to her original evidence for p. It could
even be that at noon Brown would not have suspected that she learned p from
a history text—if, say, p were a biographical detail about a famous scientist
or mathematician. Brown’s discovery tells her little more than that there are
some unreliable texts. And that is something she already knows. It would not
20 Even if D indicates such unreliability, some preservationists (e.g. Goldman 2011: 262) would
not concede that it defeats preservative justification. If they are correct they confirm my present
point: it is hard to defeat preservative justification.
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defeat her support for p. More generally, for S to have a higher-order defeater
for her preservative justification, she must have reason to believe that her total
evidence for p does not support p. It is hard to gain reason to believe this if she
has forgotten what any of her evidence was. Even if Brown could infer that she
probably gained evidence for p from her course’s text, she still has no reason to
suppose she didn’t have additional evidence for p. She might have heard about
p from other history courses or textbooks or instructors too. She might have
seen a documentary or heard in everyday conversation that p. As far as she
can tell, any of this could have been part of her original evidential basis for her
belief that p. To discredit one seemingly likely source is not enough to undercut
preservative justification. Brown has not yet acquired a higher-order defeater.
HOD identifies one type of undercutting defeater of preservative justifi-
cation. I see no other types worth considering here. Perhaps HOD requires
refinement. Perfecting it will not affect my present, general point: on (b), un-
dercutting defeaters for preservative justification are hard to acquire. They are
not readily available via introspection, rational intuition, memory, perception,
or clearly trustworthy testimony.
Now I will argue that on (b) preservative justification is for two reasons
too hard to defeat. Defeating it is so hard that preservationism leads to an
implausible asymmetry:
Grandfathering. If at t2 S becomes overall justified in believing that E no longer sufficiently
supports p for S, then for S basing a belief that p on only E at t2 is unjustified. But if at
t2 S becomes overall justified in believing that E no longer sufficiently supports p for S,
and S based belief that p at t1 on only E and has retained belief that p until t2, then S’s
belief at t2 is ceteris paribus justified.
Other things being equal, basing belief on undercut evidence is not justified,
but a belief already based on undercut evidence is justified.Why ‘ceteris paribus’?
Because in ordinary circumstances a subject lacks reason to believe that some
defeated evidence was her only past evidence for a proposition, so her preser-
vative justification that traces back to that evidence remains undefeated. Yet,
once the evidence is defeated, a subject can no longer base belief on it with
justification. Preservationism grandfathers past justification. Belief based on
evidence typically remains justified when the evidence is defeated, yet belief
can no longer be based on that evidence with justification. The asymmetry
here is troubling. It is plausible that, once evidence is defeated, all beliefs
based on only it share one justificatory status, regardless of when they were
formed.
Preservative justification is on (b) too hard to defeat for a second reason.
Recall the alleged problem of forgotten defeat. That is the problem a theory
faces when it allows a subject to become justified in believing a proposi-
tion if she forgets all reasons not to believe it. The fundamental idea motivat-
ing this problem is that merely forgetting relevant information—becoming
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ignorant—should not contribute to or allow justification.21 On (b), Brown’s
preservative justification is not defeated in CASE3, merely on account of
Brown’s forgetfulness of the original basis of her belief that p. Her ignorance
insulates her preservative justification from potential higher-order defeaters.
(Indeed, the greater the ignorance of a belief ’s source, the thicker the insula-
tion. And as I noted above, studies show that we have fairly little memory for
the particular sources of particular beliefs.) So preservationism is in trouble. It
conflicts with the fundamental idea. In this respect, it is no better than theories
that face the problem of forgotten defeat. That preservationism avoids this
problem is ultimately no asset.
You might think that the fundamental idea is simply misguided. So, it is
not bad if on (b) preservationism conflicts with it. Just deny the fundamental
idea. I find the fundamental idea implausible, so I appreciate the appeal of
this response. Unfortunately for preservationists, however, denying the funda-
mental idea incurs two costs. First, part of the motivation for preservationism
is that it fully solves the problems of stored beliefs and forgotten evidence
without introducing the problem of forgotten defeat. But the fundamental idea
alone makes it seem as if there could be a problem of forgotten defeat. If the
fundamental idea is misguided, the problem dissolves. Theories that seemed
to face the problem are therefore not at a disadvantage. So preservationism
lacks an apparent main advantage over the rivals that seemed to face it.
Secondly, if the fundamental idea is false and so the problem of forgotten
defeat dissolves, we lose reason to suppose preservationism fully solves the
problem of stored beliefs. If there is no problem of forgotten defeat, a stored
belief that was never justified overall might become justified overall once all
defeaters for it are lost. (There is no clear reason to deny this happens, if we deny the
fundamental idea.) But preservationism cannot account for this justification.
The belief has never been overall justified, so the antecedent of preservationism
is never satisfied. Preservationism loses support over rivals that can account
for justification in such cases of forgotten defeat.
On (b), preservative justification is too hard to undercut. It’s readily rebut-
ted, rarely eliminated. Preservationism leads to grandfathering and conflicts
with the fundamental idea, which it can deny only at a high cost. So preser-
vationism lacks key motivation. On (a), preservationism seems false. It faces
a new evil demon problem centred on the retaining of justification, allowing
preservative justification to be lost too opaquely from the subject’s perspective.
In short, preservationism has no good account of what happens to preservative
justification when forgotten justifiers are undercut. One plausible conclusion
is that forgotten justifiers don’t justify. If they don’t, preservationism is false.
21 This is the central motivation I find in Annis (1980: 325–6), Goldman (2009: 324), Greco
(2005: 266–8), Jackson (2011: 569–70), and Senor (2010: 523).
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IV. FAILED RECALL
I will introduce preservationism’s final dilemma with:
CASE5. Black once formed a justified belief that p and has retained it without acquiring
relevant defeaters. A moment before noon today, he is asked: p or not-p? At noon today
he thinks about p, but fails to recall it. Black has no occurrent experiential support for p
at noon.
Preservationism implies that, a moment before noon today, Black’s belief that p
has preservative justification. Since it is undefeated his belief is overall justified.
But at noon today he tries to recall whether p but fails and has no occurrent
experience supporting p, including no metacognitive support for p—he doesn’t
have a feeling of knowing the answer, p is not on the tip of his tongue, he isn’t
recalling other propositions that support p, and so on. Black at noon lacks any
experience that might justify believing p.
Now, is Black’s belief that p at noon still overall justified to the same degree
it was a moment before noon? Either (a) yes, Black’s belief remains justified to
the same degree, or (b) no, the justification is at least partially defeated. So far I
have been silent on preservationism’s implications about the strength or degree of
preservative justification. Typically, its advocates are also silent on this. Some
preservationists (e.g., Owens 1999: 323) think that a belief with preservative
justification is justified at least to the same degree that it initially was. Other
preservationists (Huemer 1999: 354) think that the strength of preservative
justification eventually degrades. (I note that, if it degrades below whatever
level is required for knowledge, preservationism doesn’t explain how we have
so much stored knowledge.) Fortunately, we needn’t pick any particular version
of preservationism here. What matters is just that preservationism implies that
a subject who retains a previously justified belief that p has some degree of
prima facie justification for believing p. As long as there is some degree, we
can discuss partial defeaters of preservative justification, that is, defeaters that
somewhat lower the degree of overall justification, whatever that degree is.
I will focus on the degree of propositional justification that preservationism
attributes. This will help us appreciate the full range of potential defeaters.
Option (a) is initially attractive in part because a single failure to recall a
proposition is not clearly itself epistemically significant.22 We all fail at recalling
well-known things at times and then manage to recall them a moment later.
It seems that our degree of justification during the brief failure needn’t have
dropped. If, say, Black had knowledge-level justification for believing that p a
moment before noon, he might still have it a moment after. Nonetheless, I will
22 See Dokic (2001: 217) and Pappas (1983: 253). For Goldman (2011: 262) preservative justifi-
cation is highly resistant to defeat due to the reliability of the belief-preservation process. Goldman
even hesitates to concede that misleading testimony against the reliability of memory can defeat
preservative justification.
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argue that preservationism has an implausible consequence on (a). In order to
support my argument, I will mention two final cases. First:
CASE6. At all times before noon Black∗ is mentally just like Black and is in the same
type of environment. Black∗ once formed a justified belief that p and has retained it ever
since, without acquiring relevant defeaters. A moment before noon today, he is asked: p
or not-p? At noon today he thinks about p and immediately and vividly recalls p.
On preservationism, Black∗ has preservative justification for believing p a
moment prior to noon. Since he successfully recalls p and has no defeaters,
his preservative justification is not at all defeated at noon. He is as justified as
he was a moment before. If he had knowledge-level preservative justification
then, he has it at noon.
Secondly:
CASE7. At all times before noon Black∗∗ is mentally just like Black and Black∗, and is
in the same type of environment that they are in. Black∗∗ once formed a justified belief
that p and has retained it ever since, without acquiring relevant defeaters. A moment
before noon today, he is asked: p or not-p? At noon today he thinks about p and weakly,
dimly recalls p.
Black∗∗’s recollective experience that p is not detailed or vivid. It lacks a
certain felt persistence that Black∗’s experience had, and Black∗∗ lacks other
metacognitive support for p that Black∗ had. I propose that:
P1. At noon Black∗∗ is less justified than Black∗ is in believing that p.
Black∗ is at least somewhat justified in believing that p. (P1) does not state how
strongly he or Black∗∗ is justified in believing that p, or even that Black∗∗ is
justified in believing that p at all, or even that Black∗∗ is significantly less justified
in believing that p than Black∗ is. It merely states that Black∗∗ is less justified
than Black∗ is. (P1) is plausible. If that is not yet obvious, consider this.
Our retrieval fluency, or our ease of recall or remembering, massively influ-
ences whether and how confidently we endorse the information we retrieve
from memory.23 It influences what, on the basis of memory, we occurrently
believe. More generally our processing fluency, or our ease of accessing informa-
tion, massively influences our occurrent believing and level of confidence.24
High fluency correlates with belief and higher confidence, while low fluency
correlates with lower confidence.25
Our level of retrieval fluency should at least roughly correlate with our level
of rational confidence in what we recollect. If it does not, then it seems we are
systematically irrational; our memory beliefs and level of confidence generally
covary with something that is independent of justification and rationality. That
23 See e.g., Kelley and Lindsay (1993) and Schwarz (1998).
24 See e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer (2009).
25 See Kelley and Lindsay (1993).
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is an unwelcome kind of actual scepticism, one that denies that we in fact have
approximately the justification or rational confidence it seems we have. This
scepticism poorly supplements preservationism, a theory that is supposed to
account for the justification we seem to have. It is plausible that our level of
retrieval fluency roughly correlates with our level of rational confidence.26
Given the relative fluency of their retrievals, Black∗∗ is rational in having
lower confidence in p than Black∗ is. And lower rational confidence comes
with less justification than higher rational confidence does. (P1) follows. If, say,
Black∗ has just enough justification for believing that p at noon to allow him
to know that p, Black∗∗ does not.
Recall that on option (a), preservationism tells us that in CASE5 Black
acquires no defeaters for p at noon, the time of his failure to recall p. Black’s
overall justification hasn’t decreased at noon. Neither has Black∗’s. Given this,
I propose preservationists should hold that, although Black and Black∗ differ
in some regards:
P2. At noon Black is as justified as Black∗ is in believing that p.
But now preservationism is in trouble. For we can reason:
P1. At noon Black∗∗ is less justified than Black∗ is in believing that p.
P2. At noon Black is as justified as Black∗ is in believing that p.
C. At noon Black∗∗ is less justified than Black is in believing that p. (P1, P2)
Black fails at recalling p, and Black∗∗ manages to recall p, yet Black has more
justification for believing that p. To generalize, other things being equal, if a
subject has retained an initially justified belief, actually recalling the believed
proposition with low fluency results in less justification than failing to recall
it does! This is implausible. The challenge preservationism faces, given (a), is
that of either avoiding (C) or explaining away (C)’s apparent implausibility.
One might resist (P2)—thereby avoiding (C)—by proposing that Black∗ has
more justification for believing p than Black does, because Black∗’s recollective
experience boosts his justification. His degree of justification goes up at noon.
This proposal is appealing. But many preservationists (e.g., Huemer 1999:
353–4), especially the anti-generativists (e.g., Goldman 2009: 323, 2011: 259–
60, Naylor 2015, and Senor 2007) will deny it. Preservationists typically deny
that a memory experience can increase one’s justification for p beyond the
preserved level. More importantly, if preservationism is true the proposal has
an implausible consequence. Suppose that Black∗’s preservative justification a
moment before noon is just beneath the strength required for knowledge. By
recalling p at noon his justification boosts to knowledge-level. So he comes to
26 Retrieval fluency is, at any rate, ‘generally a reliable basis for confidence’ (Kelley and
Lindsay 1993: 21). Cf. Reber and Unkelbach (2010: 574–5), who in effect argue that retrieval
fluency is a conditionally-reliable guide for believing.
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know that pmerely by recalling it. This is not a case in which he comes to know
p by forming a belief that p on the basis of recollection, nor by defeating a defeater
for p via recollection, nor by recalling p with unusual vivacity, nor by recalling
previously unappreciated support for p, nor by recalling p after having forgotten p.
His mere recollection that p promotes his justified, true, non-Gettiered belief
that p into knowledge. But it is implausible that belief can be promoted into
knowledge in this way.
One might try to explain away (C)’s apparent implausibility as follows.
Difficult recall is at least a partial defeater of one’s justification. A moment
before noon, and at noon, Black∗∗ is prima facie justified in believing that
p to the same degree. But at least some of that justification is defeated by
his disfluent recalling experience, so his overall justification decreases at noon.
When, like Black, one fails at recalling, one has no defeater and so the strength
of one’s overall justification remains. At noon, Black∗∗ and Black differ only in
their overall justification, not in their prima facie justification. Defeat explains
the apparent implausibility of (C).
Here are two problems for this reply. First, suppose weak recall is a defeater.
Maybe it defeats because it gives one reason to doubt that one has a good
memory, or to doubt that one recalls p as well as one would if p were true. But
total recall failure would also introduce these doubts. Total recollective failure
is defeater too, then. But (a) denies precisely this! The reply contravenes (a).
Secondly, it seems weak recall that p cannot be a defeater, since it seems to
be (weak) evidence for p. After all, weak recall displays p’s truth, even if the
display could be better. But if weak recall that p is evidence for p, it does not
defeat one’s prima facie justification for believing that p. Additional evidence
for p—evidence that doesn’t bear on any other evidence one has for p and that
introduces no relevant doubt—does not reduce one’s justification for believing
p. Of course, it might seem that weak recall that p does introduce some relevant
doubt. But, again, if weak recall does, a total failure to recall should too, and
we must then reject (a).
On option (a), preservationism incorrectly leads to (C). Denying preserva-
tionism avoids (C).Without preservationism, it is unclear that Black and Black∗
are equally justified in believing p at noon; (P2) lacks support.
Similarly, on option (b), preservationism avoids (C). Option (b) states that
Black’s failure to recall p at least partially defeats his justification.27 So there
is insufficient support for (P2). But what could Black’s partial defeater be?
We need a plausible explanation. A partial defeater for p somewhat lowers
one’s overall justification for believing p. A partial rebutting defeater does this by
providing some evidence that p is false. But Black’s failure to recall p provides
27 Cf. Martin (2001: 262), who suggests that temporary retrieval failure is incompatible with
memorial knowledge.
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him with no evidence that p is false. He has not acquired a partial rebutting
defeater.
A partial undercutting defeater reduces one’s overall justification by, roughly,
weakening how well one satisfies a condition necessary for having overall
justification. It is hard to say exactly how this weakening occurs, but our intu-
itive grasp of this phenomenon will suffice here. In Section III, we considered
two theses stating requirements for overall memorial justification (OMJ1 and
OMJ2) and a type of undercutting defeater (higher order). OMJ1 requires
that the subject’s total past and present memorial support has been adequate.
OMJ2 requires that the subject is not justified in doubting the adequacy of this
support. If Black’s retrieval failure reduced his overall justification in the light
of these requirements, it would weaken how well he satisfies one of them. But
Black at noon satisfies them just as well as he did a moment before. His total
past and present memorial support for p is unchanged, and he is no closer to
having justification for believing that it was poor. So Black’s retrieval failure
offers no partial higher-order defeater.
A possibly tempting explanation of Black’s partial defeat is that his failure
to recall p indicates to him that he doesn’t believe that p. And, clearly, if one
lacks a belief that p, then one lacks a justified belief that p. His failure to recall,
then, indicates that he lacks a justified belief that p, thereby at least partially
defeating his justification for believing that p.
This explanation is inadequate. We will identify memorial undercutting
defeaters only by identifying the necessary conditions for overall memorial
justification that they prevent subjects from satisfying. Recall that it was OMJ1
that made OMJ2 plausible. OMJ1 states a necessary condition for overall
memory justification, and OMJ2 states that one cannot reasonably doubt that
one meets that condition, if one is overall memorially justified. In order for
doubts about whether one believes p to undercut memorial justification for p,
something like the following must be the case:
OMJ3. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then S believes that p.
This would make it plausible that:
OMJ4. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then it is not the case that
S is overall justified in believing that S does not believe that p.
The tempting explanation would then suggest that Black’s retrieval failure
weakens how well he satisfies OMJ4. That is why his retrieval failure is a
partial undercutting defeater.
But OMJ3 is false. It is not the case that overall memorial justification for
believing that p requires belief that p. Memory can retain information that we
neglect to endorse, overall justifying us in having beliefs we unfortunately lack.
We aren’t epistemically perfect! And if OMJ3 is false, we have no support for
OMJ4.
504 MATTHEW FRISE
Further, OMJ4 is independently implausible. An overall rational doubt
about whether one believes that p is not itself reason not to believe that p.
Sometimes when we discover that we don’t believe something, the justified
response is to form belief. Finally, even if OMJ4 is correct, it is not clear that
Black has reason to doubt he believes that p. Mere momentary retrieval failure
does not indicate a lack of belief. It just indicates a lack of occurrent belief. It
can take time to recall or to activate a stored belief. The partial undercutting
defeat of Black’s justification for believing that p is not due to any reasonable
doubts about whether he believes that p.
A more promising explanation of Black’s partial defeat begins with:
OMJ5. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then S is disposed to
recall p.
And this supports:
OMJ6. If S is overall memorially justified in believing that p, then it is not the case that
S is overall justified in believing that S is not disposed to recall p.
The explanation continues: Black’s failure to recall p indicates to Black that
he lacks not a belief that p, but a disposition to recall p. If he had such a
disposition, he would not in ordinary circumstances have failed at recalling
p upon trying. Perhaps his retrieval failure weakens his satisfaction of OMJ5.
Even if it does not, he has still gained some reason to doubt that he is disposed
to recall p. This weakens Black’s satisfaction of OMJ6. And that explains the
partial defeat of his preservative justification for believing p.
This explanation has merit. OMJ6 is plausible. Support for it crucially
traces back to OMJ5. It’s hard to see how OMJ6 could be true if OMJ5 were
false. It’s hard to see how doubting that you are in condition C undercuts your
justification, unless being in C is required for overall justification. OMJ5 is
plausible. But preservationism appeals to it at its own peril. Preservationism
is supposed to offer an economical solution to the problems of stored beliefs
and forgotten evidence: in the thorny cases of stored belief and forgotten evi-
dence, the subject has preservative justification. On OMJ5, overall memorial
justification requires a recollective disposition. So, in the thorny cases of stored
belief and forgotten evidence, the subject has a recollective disposition.
But in Section II, I noted that Conee & Feldman (2011: 304–5) defend a
solution to the problems of stored beliefs and forgotten evidence that rivals
preservationism: having a disposition to recall p is sufficient for having prima
facie justification for believing p. OMJ5 requires the preservationist solution to
these problems to posit precisely what Conee and Feldman posit: in all relevant
cases, the subject has a suitable recollective disposition. Conee and Feldman’s
solution posits nothing more. Yet preservationism’s solution posits quite a bit
more. It posits that the subject in each case formed a justified belief that p in
the past and has believed p ever since, and that this is a means of retaining
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justification; reliabilist preservationists will also posit that certain reliability
conditions obtain. It is therefore unclear why we should not, in the interests of
simplicity, just adopt Conee and Feldman’s view.
Again, this is not an argument for their view. It is an observation that, on
the promising account of why failed recall introduces a partial defeater (the
account that appeals to OMJ5 and OMJ6), the preservationist solution to
other problems importantly overlaps with a much more parsimonious rival.
The preservationist solution is inferior; on option (b), preservationism lacks
key support. It solves only problems that can be better solved. And on option
(a) preservationism leads to (C). So we have reason to avoid preservationism.
V. CONCLUSION
I have presented three dilemmas for preservationism, an orthodox and un-
challenged view in the epistemology of memory. Here are the results. Either
preservationism faces a version of the new evil demon problem or it does not
fully solve the problems that motivate it. Either preservationism faces another
version of the new evil demon problem or it faces a problem it was supposed to
avoid. And either preservationism lets failed recall result in more justification
than successful recall does or there is a simpler rival solution to the problems
that motivate it. Each dilemma shows that preservationism either is false or
lacks key support. Together they give us reason to deny preservationism, or at
least reason to explore other options.28
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